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ABSTRACT
Internet memes are increasingly used to sway and possi-
bly manipulate public opinion, thus prompting the need to
study their propagation, evolution, and influence across the
Web. In this paper, we detect and measure the propagation
of memes across multiple Web communities, using a pro-
cessing pipeline based on perceptual hashing and clustering
techniques, and a dataset of 160M images from 2.6B posts
gathered from Twitter, Reddit, 4chan’s Politically Incorrect
board (/pol/), and Gab over the course of 13 months. We
group the images posted on fringe Web communities (/pol/,
Gab, and The Donald subreddit) into clusters, annotate them
using meme metadata obtained from Know Your Meme, and
also map images from mainstream communities (Twitter and
Reddit) to the clusters.
Our analysis provides an assessment of the popularity and
diversity of memes in the context of each community, show-
ing, e.g., that racist memes are extremely common in fringe
Web communities. We also find a substantial number of
politics-related memes on both mainstream and fringe Web
communities, supporting media reports that memes might be
used to enhance or harm politicians. Finally, we use Hawkes
processes to model the interplay between Web communities
and quantify their reciprocal influence, finding that /pol/ sub-
stantially influences the meme ecosystem with the number of
memes it produces, while The Donald has a higher success
rate in pushing them to other communities.
1. INTRODUCTION
The Web has become one of the most impactful vehicles
for the propagation of ideas and culture. Images, videos, and
slogans are created and shared online at an unprecedented
pace. Some of these, commonly referred to as memes, be-
come viral, evolve, and eventually enter popular culture. The
term “meme” was first coined by Richard Dawkins [11], who
framed them as cultural analogues to genes, as they too self-
replicate, mutate, and respond to selective pressures [17].
Numerous memes have become integral part of Internet cul-
ture, with well-known examples including the Trollface [48],
Bad Luck Brian [25], and Rickroll [43].
While most memes are generally ironic in nature, used
with no bad intentions, others have assumed negative and/or
hateful connotations, including outright racist and aggres-
sive undertones [69]. These memes, often generated by
fringe communities, are being “weaponized” and even be-
coming part of political and ideological propaganda [58].
For example, memes were adopted by mainstream political
candidates during the 2016 US Presidential Elections as part
of their iconography [18]; in October 2015, then-candidate
Donald Trump retweeted an image depicting him as Pepe
The Frog, a controversial symbol [6]. In this context, polar-
ized communities within 4chan and Reddit have been work-
ing hard to create new memes and make them go viral, aim-
ing to increase the visibility of their ideas—a phenomenon
known as “attention hacking” [56].
Despite their increasingly relevant role, we lack the mea-
surements and the computational tools to understand the ori-
gins and the influence of memes. The online information
ecosystem is very complex; social networks do not operate
in a vacuum but rather influence each other as to how infor-
mation spreads [72]. However, previous work (see Sec. 6)
has mostly focused on social networks in an isolated man-
ner. In this paper, we aim to bridge these gaps by identifying
and addressing a few research questions: 1) How can we
characterize memes, and how they evolve and propagate?
2) Can we track meme propagation across multiple commu-
nities and measure their influence? 3) How can we study
variants of the same meme? 4) Can we characterize Web
communities through the lens of memes?
We focus on four Web communities: Twitter, Reddit, Gab,
and 4chan’s Politically Incorrect board (/pol/), because of
their impact on the information ecosystem [72] and anecdo-
tal evidence of them disseminating weaponized memes [62].
We design a processing pipeline and use it over 160M im-
ages posted between July 2016 and July 2017 on these four
Web communities. Our pipeline relies on perceptual hashing
(pHash) and clustering techniques; the former extracts repre-
sentative feature vectors from the images encapsulating their
visual peculiarities, while the latter allow us to detect groups
of images that are part of the same meme. We design and
implement a custom distance metric, based on both pHash
and meme metadata (obtained from knowyourmeme.com),
and use it to understand the interplay between the different





Figure 1: An example of a meme (Smug Frog) that provides
an intuition of what an image, a cluster, and a meme is.
reciprocal influence of each Web community with respect to
the dissemination of image-based memes.
Findings. Some of our findings (among many) are:
1. The influence estimation analysis reveals that /pol/ and
The Donald are influential actors in the meme ecosys-
tem, despite their modest size. We find that /pol/ sub-
stantially influences the meme ecosystem by posting a
large number of memes, while The Donald is the most
efficient community in pushing memes to both fringe
and mainstream Web communities.
2. Communities within 4chan, Reddit, and Gab use me-
mes to share hateful and racist content. For in-
stance, among the most popular cluster of memes,
we find variants of the anti-semitic “Happy Merchant”
meme [32] and the controversial Pepe the Frog [39].
3. Our custom distance metric effectively reveals the phy-
logenetic relationships of clusters of images. This is
evident from the graph that shows the clusters obtained
from /pol/, Reddit’s The Donald subreddit, and Gab
available for exploration from [1].
Contributions. First, we develop a robust processing
pipeline for detecting and tracking memes across multi-
ple Web communities. Based on pHash and clustering al-
gorithms, it supports large-scale measurements of meme
ecosystems. Second, we introduce a custom distance metric,
geared to highlight hidden correlations between memes and
better understand the interplay and overlap between them.
Third, we provide a characterization of multiple Web com-
munities (Twitter, Reddit, Gab, and /pol/) with respect to the
memes they share, and an analysis of their reciprocal influ-
ence using the Hawkes Processes statistical model. Finally,
by releasing our processing pipeline and datasets, we will
support further measurements in this space.
2. METHODOLOGY
In this section, we present our methodology for measuring
the propagation of memes across Web communities.
2.1 Overview
Memes are high-level concepts or ideas that spread within
a culture [11]. In Internet vernacular, a meme usually refers
to variants of a particular image, video, cliche´, etc. that share
a common theme and are disseminated by a large number of
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Figure 2: High-level overview of our processing pipeline.
To gain an understanding of how memes propagate across
the Web, with a particular focus on discovering the commu-
nities that are most influential in spreading them, our intu-
ition is to build clusters of visually similar images, allowing
us to track variants of a meme. We then group clusters that
belong to the same meme to study and track the meme itself.
In Fig. 1, we provide a visual representation of the Smug
Frog meme [46], which includes many variants of the same
image and several clusters of variants. Cluster 1 has vari-
ants from a Jurassic Park scene, where one of the characters
is hiding from two velociraptors behind a kitchen counter:
the frogs are stylized to look similar to velociraptors, and
the character hiding varies to express a particular message.
For example, in the image in the top right corner, the two
frogs are searching for an anti-semitic caricature of a Jew.
Cluster N shows variants of the smug frog wearing a Nazi
officer military cap with the infamous “Arbeit macht frei” in
the background. Overall, these clusters represent the branch-
ing nature of memes: as a new variant of a meme becomes
prevalent, it often branches into its own sub-meme, poten-
tially incorporating imagery from other memes.
2.2 Processing Pipeline
We now introduce our processing pipeline, also presented
in Fig. 2. As discussed in Sec. 2.1, our methodology aims
at identifying clusters of similar images and assign them to
higher level groups, which are the actual memes. We first
discuss the types of data sources needed for our approach,
i.e., meme annotation sites and Web communities that post
memes (dotted rounded rectangles in the figure). Then, we
describe each of the operations performed by our pipeline
(Steps 1-7, see regular rectangles).
Data Sources. Our pipeline uses two types of data sources:
1) sites providing meme annotation and 2) Web communities
that disseminate memes. In this paper, we use Know Your
Meme for the former, and Twitter, Reddit, /pol/, and Gab for
the latter (see Sec. 3). However, our methodology supports
any annotation site and any Web community, and this why
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we add the “Generic” sites/communities notation in Fig. 2.
pHash Extraction (Step 1). We use the Perceptual Hashing
(pHash) algorithm [57] to calculate a fingerprint of each im-
age in such a way that any two images that look similar to the
human eye map to a “similar” hash value. pHash generates
a feature vector of 64 elements that describe an image, com-
puted from the Discrete Cosine Transform among the differ-
ent frequency domains of the image. Thus, visually similar
images have minor differences in their vectors. The algo-
rithm is also robust against changes in the images, e.g., sig-
nal processing operations and direct manipulation [73], and
effectively reduces the dimensionality of the raw images.
Clustering via pairwise distance calculation (Steps 2-3).
Next, we cluster images from one or more Web Communi-
ties using the pHash values. We perform a pairwise compar-
ison of all the pHashes using Hamming distance (Step 2).
To support large numbers of images, we implement a highly
parallelizable system on top of TensorFlow [4], which uses
multiple GPUs to enhance performance (see Sec. 7). Images
are clustered using a density-based algorithm (Step 3). Our
current implementation uses DBSCAN [14], mainly because
it can discover clusters of arbitrary shape and performs well
over large, noisy datasets.
Screenshots Removal (Step 4). Meme annotation sites like
KYM often include, in their image galleries, screenshots of
social network posts that are not variants of a meme but
just comments about it. Hence, we discard social-network
screenshots from the annotation sites data sources using a
deep learning classifier. Due to space limitations, we refer
readers to Appendix A of the extended version of the pa-
per [71] for details on the classifier.
Cluster Annotation (Steps 5). Clustering annotation uses
the medoid of each cluster, i.e., the element with the mini-
mum square average distance from all images in the cluster.
In other words, the medoid is the image that best represents
the cluster. The clusters’ medoids are compared with all im-
ages from meme annotation sites, by calculating the Ham-
ming distance between each pair of pHash vectors. We con-
sider that an image matches a cluster if the distance is less
than or equal to a threshold θ, which we set to 8, as it allows
us to capture the diversity of images that are part of the same
meme while maintaining a low number of false positives.
As the annotation process considers all the images of a
KYM entry’s image gallery, it is likely we will get multi-
ple annotations for a single cluster. To find the represen-
tative KYM entry for each cluster, we select the one with
the largest proportion of matches of KYM images with the
cluster medoid. In case of ties, we select the one with the
minimum average Hamming distance.
Association of images to memes (Step 6). To associate im-
ages posted on Web communities (e.g., Twitter, Reddit, etc.)
to memes, we compare them with the clusters’ medoids, us-
ing the same threshold θ. This is conceptually similar to Step
5, but uses images from Web communities instead of images
from annotation sites. This lets us identify memes posted
in generic Web communities and collect relevant metadata
from the posts (e.g., the timestamp of a tweet). Note that we
track the propagation of memes in generic Web communities
(e.g., Twitter) using a seed of memes obtained by clustering
images from other (fringe) Web communities. More specifi-
cally, our seeds will be memes generated on three fringe Web
communities (/pol/, The Donald subreddit, Gab); nonethe-
less, our methodology can be applied to any community.
Analysis and Influence Estimation (Step 7). We analyze
all the relevant clusters and the occurrences of memes on
the Web communities, aiming to assess: 1) their popularity
and diversity in each community; 2) their temporal evolu-
tion; 3) how communities influence each other with respect
to meme dissemination (see Sec. 4 and 5).
2.3 Distance Metric
To better understand the interplay and connections be-
tween the clusters, we introduce a custom distance metric,
which relies on both the visual peculiarities of the images
(via pHash) and data available from annotation sites. The
distance metric supports one of two modes: 1) one for when
both clusters are annotated (full-mode), and 2) another for
when one or none of the clusters is annotated (partial-mode).
Definition. Let c be a cluster of images and F a set of fea-
tures extracted from the clusters. The custom distance metric
between cluster ci and cj is defined as:
distance(ci, cj) = 1−
∑
f∈F
wf × rf(ci, cj) (1)
where rf(ci, cj) denotes the similarity between the features
of type f ∈ F of cluster ci and cj , and wf is a weight
that represents the relevance of each feature. Note that∑
f wf = 1 and rf (ci, cj) = {x ∈ R | 0 ≤ x ≤ 1}. Thus,
distance(ci, cj) is a number between 0 and 1.
Features. We consider four different features for rf∈F,
specifically, F = {perceptual,meme, people, culture}.
rperceptual. This feature is the similarity between two clus-
ters from a perceptual viewpoint. Let h be a pHash vector for
an image m in cluster c, where m is the medoid of the clus-
ter, and dij the Hamming distance between vectors hi and
hj (see in Step 5). We compute dij from ci and cj as fol-
lows. First, we obtain obtain the medoid mi from cluster ci.
Subsequently, we obtain hi=pHash(mi). Finally, we com-
pute dij=Hamming(hi, hj). We simplify notation and use
d instead of dij to denote the distance between two medoid
images and refer to this distance as the Hamming score.
We define the perceptual similarity between two clusters
as an exponential decay function over the Hamming score d:
rperceptual(d) = 1−
d
τ × emax/τ (2)
where max represents the maximum pHash distance be-
tween two images and τ is a constant parameter, or
smoother, that controls how fast the exponential function
decays for all values of d (recall that {d ∈ R | 0 ≤ d ≤
max}). Note that max is bound to the precision given by
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the pHash algorithm. Recall that each pHash has a size
of |d|=64, hence max=64. Intuitively, when τ << 64,
rperceptual is a high value only with perceptually indistin-
guishable images, e.g., for τ=1, two images with d=0 have
a similarity rperceptual=1.0. With the same τ , the similar-
ity drops to 0.4 when d=1. By contrast, when τ is close
to 64, rperceptual decays almost linearly. For example, for
τ=64, rperceptual(d=0)=1.0 and rperceptual(d=1)=0.98.
As mentioned above, we observe that pairs of images with
scores between d=0 and d=8 are usually part of the same
variant (see Step 5 in Sec. 2.2). In our implementation, we
set τ=25 as rperceptual returns high values up to d=8, and
rapidly decays thereafter.
rmeme, rculture, rpeople. Our annotation process (Step
5) provides contextualized information about the cluster
medoid, including the name (i.e., the main identifier) given
to a meme, the associated culture (i.e., high-level group of
meme), and people that are included in a meme. (Note that
we use all the annotations for each category and not only the
representative one, see Step 5.) Therefore, we model a dif-
ferent similarity for each of the these categories, by looking
at the overlap of all the annotations among the medoids of
both clusters (mi, mj , for ci and cj , respectively). Specif-
ically, for each category, we calculate the Jaccard index be-
tween the annotations of both medoids, for memes, cultures,
and people, thus acquiring rmeme, rculture, rpeople, respec-
tively.
Modes. Our distance metric measures how similar two clus-
ters are. If both clusters are annotated, we operate in “full-
mode,” and in “partial-mode” otherwise. For each mode, we
use different weights for the features in Eq. 1, which we set
empirically as we lack the ground-truth data needed to auto-
mate the computation of the optimal set of thresholds.
Full-mode. In full-mode, we set weights as follows: 1) The
features from the perceptual and meme categories should
have higher relevance than people and culture, as they are
intrinsically related to the definition of meme (see Sec. 2.1).
The last two are non-discriminant features, yet are informa-
tive and should contribute to the metric. 2) rmeme should
not outweigh rperceptual because of the relevance that visual
similarities have on the different variants of a meme. Like-
wise, rperceptual should not dominate over rmeme because
of the branching nature of the memes. Thus, we want these
two categories to play an equally important weight.
Therefore, we choose wperceptual=0.4, wmeme=0.4,
wpeople=0.1, wculture=0.1 . This means that when two
clusters belong to the same meme and their medoids are per-
ceptually similar, the distance between the clusters will be
small. In fact, it will be at most 0.2 = 1 − (0.4 + 0.4) if
people and culture do not match, and 0.0 if they also match.
Note that our metric also assigns small distance values for
the following two cases: 1) when two clusters are part of the
same meme variant, and 2) when two clusters use the same
image for different memes.
Partial-mode. In this mode, we associate unannotated im-
Platform #Posts #Posts with #Images #Unique
Images pHashes
Twitter 1,469,582,378 242,723,732 114,459,736 74,234,065
Reddit 1,081,701,536 62,321,628 40,523,275 30,441,325
/pol/ 48,725,043 13,190,390 4,325,648 3,626,184
Gab 12,395,575 955,440 235,222 193,783
KYM 15,584 15,584 706,940 597,060
Table 1: Overview of our datasets.
ages with any of the known clusters. This is a critical com-
ponent of our analysis (Step 6), allowing us to study images
from generic Web communities where annotations are un-
available. In this case, we rely entirely on the perceptual
features. We once again use Eq. 1, but simply set all weights
to 0, except for wperceptual (which is set to 1). That is, we
compare the image we want to test with the medoid of the
cluster and we apply Eq. 2 as described above.
3. DATASETS
3.1 Web Communities
As mentioned earlier, our data sources are Web communi-
ties that post memes and meme annotation sites. For the
former, we focus on four communities: Twitter, Reddit,
Gab, and 4chan (more precisely, 4chan’s Politically Incor-
rect board, /pol/). This provides a mix of mainstream social
networks (Twitter and Reddit) as well as fringe communi-
ties that are often associated with the alt-right and have an
impact on the information ecosystem (Gab and /pol/) [72].
There are several other platforms playing important roles
in spreading memes, however, many are “closed” (e.g., Face-
book) or do not involve memes based on static images (e.g.,
YouTube, Giphy). In future work, we plan to extend our
measurements to communities like Instagram and Tumblr,
as well as to GIF and video memes. Nonetheless, we believe
our data sources already allow us to elicit comprehensive in-
sights into the meme ecosystem.
Table 1 presents a summary of the number of posts and
images processed for each community, as discussed next.
Twitter. Twitter is a mainstream microblogging platform,
allowing users to broadcast 280-character messages (tweets)
to their followers. Our Twitter dataset is based on tweets
made available via the 1% Streaming API, between July
2016 and July 2017. In total, we parse 1.4B tweets: 242M
of them have at least one image. We extract all the images,
ultimately collecting 114M images yielding 74M unique
pHashes.
Reddit. Reddit is a news aggregator: users create submis-
sions by posting a URL and others can reply in a struc-
tured way. It is divided into multiple sub-communities called
subreddits, each with its own topic and moderation pol-
icy. Content popularity and ranking are determined via a
voting system based on the up- and down-votes users cast.
We gather images from Reddit using publicly available data
from Pushshift [59]. We parse all submissions and com-
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ments between July 2016 and July 2017, and extract 62M
posts that contain at least one image. We then download
40M images producing 30M unique pHashes.
4chan. 4chan is an anonymous image board; users create
new threads by posting an image with some text, which
others can reply to. It has two characteristic features:
anonymity and ephemerality. By default, user identities are
concealed, and all threads are deleted after one week. Over-
all, 4chan is known for its extremely lax moderation and the
high degree of hate and racism, especially on boards like
/pol/ [20]. We obtain all threads posted on /pol/, between
July 2016 and July 2017, using the same methodology of
[20]. Since all threads (and images) are removed after a
week, we use a public archive service called 4plebs [3] to
collect 4.3M images, thus yielding 3.6M unique pHashes.
Gab. Gab is a social network launched in August 2016 as
a “champion” of free speech, providing “shelter” to users
banned from other platforms. It combines social network-
ing features from Twitter (broadcast of 300-character mes-
sages) and Reddit (content is ranked according to up- and
down-votes). It also has extremely lax moderation as it al-
lows everything except illegal pornography, terrorist propa-
ganda, and doxing [63]. Overall, Gab attracts alt-right users,
conspiracy theorists, and trolls, and high volumes of hate
speech [70]. We collect 12M posts, posted on Gab between
August 2016 and July 2017, and 955K posts have at least one
image, using the same methodology as in [70]. Out of these,
235K images are unique, producing 193K unique pHashes.
Ethics. Even though we only collect publicly available data,
our study has been approved by the designated ethics offi-
cer at UCL. Note that 4chan content is typically posted with
expectations of anonymity, thus, we stress that we have fol-
lowed standard ethical guidelines [61] and encrypted data at
rest, while making no attempt to de-anonymize users.
3.2 Meme Annotation Site
Know Your Meme (KYM). We choose KYM as the source
for meme annotation as it offers a comprehensive database of
memes. KYM is a sort of encyclopedia of Internet memes:
for each meme, it provides information such as its origin
(i.e., the platform on which it was first observed), the year
it started, as well as descriptions and examples. In addition,
for each entry, KYM provides a set of keywords, called tags,
that describe the entry. Memes are also grouped into “cul-
tures” and “subcultures” entries, associated to a wide vari-
ety of topics ranging from video games to various general
categories. For example, the Rage Comics subculture [41]
is a higher level category associated with memes related
to comics like Rage Guy [42] or LOL Guy [34], while the
Alt-right culture [22] gathers entries from a loosely defined
segment of the right-wing community. KYM also provides
entries for people (e.g., Donald Trump [29]), events (e.g.,
#CNNBlackmail [27]), and sites (e.g., /pol/ [40]).
As of May 2018, the site has 18.3K entries, specifically,
14K memes, 1.3K subcultures, 1.2K people, 1.3K events,
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Figure 3: Basic statistics from the KYM dataset.
and 427 websites [35]. We crawl KYM between October
and December 2017, acquiring data for 15.6K entries; for
each entry, we also download all the images related to it by
crawling all the pages of the image gallery. In total, we col-
lect 707K images corresponding to 597K unique pHashes.
Getting to know KYM. We also perform a general charac-
terization of KYM. First, we look at the distribution of en-
tries across categories: as expected, the majority (57%) are
memes, followed by subcultures (30%), cultures (3%), web-
sites (2%), and people (2%). Next, we measure the number
of images per entry: as shown in Fig. 3(a), this varies con-
siderably (note log-scale on x-axis). KYM entries have as
few as 1 and as many as 8K images, with an average of 45
and a median of 9 images. Larger values may be related
to the meme’s popularity, but also to the “diversity” of im-
age variants it generates. Upon manual inspection, we find
that the presence of a large number of images for the same
meme happens either when images are visually very similar
to each other (e.g., Smug Frog images within the two clusters
in Fig. 1), or if there are actually remarkably different vari-
ants of the same meme (e.g., images in ‘cluster 1’ vs. images
in ‘cluster N’ in the same figure). We also note that the dis-
tribution varies according to the category: e.g., higher-level
concepts like cultures and subcultures include more images
than more specific entries like memes and events.
We then analyze the origin of each entry: see Fig. 3(b).
YouTube, 4chan, and Twitter are the most popular platforms
with, respectively, 21%, 12%, and 11%, followed by Tumblr
and Reddit with 8% and 7%. A large portion of the memes
(28%) have an unknown origin. This confirms our intuition
that 4chan, Twitter, and Reddit, which are among our data
sources, play an important role in the generation and dissem-
ination of memes. As mentioned, we do not currently study
video memes originating from YouTube, due to the inherent
complexity of video-processing tasks as well as scalability
issues. However, a large portion of YouTube memes actu-
ally end up being morphed into image-based memes (see,
e.g., the Overly Attached Girlfriend meme [38]).
3.3 Running the pipeline on our datasets
For all four Web communities (Twitter, Reddit, /pol/, and
Gab), we perform Step 1 of the pipeline (Fig. 2), using the
ImageHash library [2]. We then perform Steps 2-3 (i.e., pair-
wise comparisons between all images and clustering), for all
the images from /pol/, The Donald subreddit, and Gab. We
exclude the rest of Reddit and Twitter as our main goal is to
5
Platform #Images Noise #Clusters #Clusters with
KYM tags (%)
/pol/ 4,325,648 63% 38,851 9,265 (24%)
T D 1,234,940 64% 21,917 2,902 (13%)
Gab 235,222 69% 3,083 447 (15%)
Table 2: Statistics obtained from clustering images from
/pol/, The Donald, and Gab.
obtain clusters of memes from fringe Web communities and
later characterize all communities by means of the clusters.
Next, we go through Steps 4-5 using all the images ob-
tained from meme annotation websites (specifically, Know
Your Meme, see Sec. 3.2) and the medoid of each cluster
from /pol/, The Donald, and Gab. Finally, Steps 6-7 use all
the pHashes obtained from Twitter, Reddit (all subreddits),
/pol/, and Gab to find posts with images matching the an-
notated clusters. This is an integral part of our process as it
allows to characterize and study Web communities not used
for clustering (i.e., Twitter and Reddit).
4. ANALYSIS
In this section, we present a cluster-based measurement
of memes as well as an analysis of a few Web communities
from the “perspective” of memes. We measure the preva-
lence of memes across the clusters obtained from fringe
communities: /pol/, The Donald subreddit (T D), and Gab.
We also use the distance metric introduced in Eq. 1 to per-
form a cross-community analysis. Then, we group clus-
ters into broad, but related, categories to gain a macro-
perspective understanding of larger communities, including
mainstream ones like Reddit and Twitter.
4.1 Cluster-based Analysis
We start by analyzing the 12.6K annotated clusters con-
sisting of 268K images from /pol/, The Donald, and Gab
(Step 5 in Fig. 2). We do so to understand the diversity of
memes in each Web community, as well as the interplay be-
tween variants of memes. We then evaluate how clusters can
be grouped into higher structures using hierarchical cluster-
ing and graph visualization techniques.
4.1.1 Clusters
Statistics. In Table 2, we report some basic statistics of the
clusters obtained for each Web community. A relatively high
percentage of images (63%–69%) are not clustered, i.e., are
labeled as noise. While in DBSCAN “noise” is just an in-
stance that does not fit in any cluster (more specifically, there
are less than 5 images with perceptual distance≤ 8 from that
particular instance), we note that this likely happens as these
images are not memes, but rather “one-off images.” For ex-
ample, on /pol/ there is a large number of pictures of random
people taken from various social media platforms.
Overall, we have 2.1M images in 63.9K clusters: 38K
clusters for /pol/, 21K for The Donald, and 3K for Gab.
12.6K of these clusters are successfully annotated using the
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Figure 4: CDF of KYM entries per cluster (a) and clusters
per KYM entry (b).
KYM data: 9.2K from /pol/ (142K images), 2.9K from
The Donald (121K images), and 447 from Gab (4.5K im-
ages). Examples of clusters are reported in Appendix B
of the extended version of the paper [71]. As for the un-
annotated clusters, manual inspection confirms that many
include miscellaneous images unrelated to memes, e.g., sim-
ilar screenshots of social networks posts (recall that we only
filter out screenshots from the KYM image galleries), im-
ages captured from video games, etc.
KYM entries per cluster. Each cluster may receive multi-
ple annotations, depending on the KYM entries that have at
least one image matching that cluster’s medoid. As shown
in Fig. 4(a), the majority of the annotated clusters (74% for
/pol/, 70% for The Donald, and 58% for Gab) only have a
single matching KYM entry. However, a few clusters have
a large number of matching entries, e.g., the one matching
the Conspiracy Keanu meme [28] is annotated by 126 KYM
entries (primarily, other memes that add text in an image as-
sociated with that meme). This highlights that memes do
overlap and that some are highly influenced by other ones.
Clusters per KYM entry. We also look at the number of
clusters annotated by the same KYM entry. Fig. 4(b) plots
the CDF of the number of clusters per entry. About 40%
only annotate a single /pol/ cluster, while 34% and 20% of
the entries annotate a single The Donald and a single Gab
cluster, respectively. We also find that a small number of en-
tries are associated to a large number of clusters: for exam-
ple, the Happy Merchant meme [32] annotates 124 different
clusters on /pol/. This highlights the diverse nature of me-
mes, i.e., memes are mixed and matched, not unlike the way
that genetic traits are combined in biological reproduction.
Top KYM entries. Because the majority of clusters match
only one or two KYM entries (Fig. 4(a)), we simplify things
by giving all clusters a representative annotation based on
the most prevalent annotation given to the medoid, and, in
the case of ties the average distance between all matches (see
Sec. 2.2). Thus, in the rest of the paper, we report our find-
ings based on the representative annotation for each cluster.
In Table 3, we report the top 20 KYM entries with respect
to the number of clusters they annotate. These cover 17%,
23%, and 27% of the clusters in /pol/, The Donald, and Gab,
respectively, hence covering a relatively good sample of our
datasets. Donald Trump [29], Smug Frog [46], and Pepe
the Frog [39] appear in the top 20 for all three communities,
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/pol/ T D Gab
Entry Category Clusters (%) Entry Category Clusters (%) Entry Category Clusters (%)
Donald Trump People 207 (2.2%) Donald Trump People 177 (6.1%) Donald Trump People 25 (5.6%)
Happy Merchant Memes 124 (1.3%) Smug Frog Memes 78 (2.7%) Happy Merchant Memes 10 (2.2%)
Smug Frog Memes 114 (1.2%) Pepe the Frog Memes 63 (2.1%) Demotivational Posters Memes 7 (1.5%)
Computer Reaction Faces Memes 112 (1.2%) Feels Bad Man/ Sad Frog Memes 61 (2.1%) Pepe the Frog Memes 6 (1.3%)
Feels Bad Man/ Sad Frog Memes 94 (1.0%) Make America Great Again Memes 50 (1.7%) #Cnnblackmail Events 6 (1.3%)
I Know that Feel Bro Memes 90 (1.0%) Bernie Sanders People 31 (1.0%) 2016 US election Events 6 (1.3%)
Tony Kornheiser’s Why Memes 89 (1.0%) 2016 US Election Events 27 (0.9%) Know Your Meme Sites 6 (1.3%)
Bait/This is Bait Memes 84 (0.9%) Counter Signal Memes Memes 24 (0.8%) Tumblr Sites 6 (1.3%)
#TrumpAnime/Rick Wilson Events 76 (0.8%) #Cnnblackmail Events 24 (0.8%) Feminism Cultures 5 (1.1%)
Reaction Images Memes 73 (0.8%) Know Your Meme Sites 20 (0.7%) Barack Obama People 5 (1.1%)
Make America Great Again Memes 72 (0.8%) Angry Pepe Memes 18 (0.6%) Smug Frog Memes 5 (1.1%)
Counter Signal Memes Memes 72 (0.8%) Demotivational Posters Memes 18 (0.6%) rwby Subcultures 5 (1.1%)
Pepe the Frog Memes 65 (0.7%) 4chan Sites 16 (0.5%) Kim Jong Un People 5 (1.1%)
Spongebob Squarepants Subcultures 61 (0.7%) Tumblr Sites 15 (0.5%) Murica Memes 5 (1.1%)
Doom Paul its Happening Memes 57 (0.6%) Gamergate Events 15 (0.5%) UA Passenger Removal Events 5 (1.1%)
Adolf Hitler People 56 (0.6%) Colbertposting Memes 15 (0.5%) Make America Great Again Memes 4 (0.9%)
pol Sites 53 (0.6%) Donald Trump’s Wall Memes 15 (0.5%) Bill Nye People 4 (0.9%)
Dubs Guy/Check’em Memes 53 (0.6%) Vladimir Putin People 15 (0.5%) Trolling Cultures 4 (0.9%)
Smug Anime Face Memes 51 (0.6%) Barack Obama People 15 (0.5%) 4chan Sites 4 (0.9%)
Warhammer 40000 Subcultures 51 (0.6%) Hillary Clinton People 15 (0.5%) Furries Cultures 3 (0.7%)
Total 1,638 (17.7%) 695 (23.9%) 121 (27.1%)
Table 3: Top 20 KYM entries appearing in the clusters of /pol/, The Donald, and Gab. We report the number of clusters and
their respective percentage (per community). Each item contains a hyperlink to the corresponding entry on the KYM website.























































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 5: Inter-cluster distance between all clusters with frog memes. Clusters are labeled with the origin (4 for 4chan, D for
The Donald, and G for Gab) and the meme name. To ease readability, we do not display all labels, abbreviate meme names,
and only show an excerpt of all relationships.
while the Happy Merchant [32] only in /pol/ and Gab. In
particular, Donald Trump annotates the most clusters (207 in
/pol/, 177 in The Donald, and 25 in Gab). In fact, politics-
related entries appear several times in the Table, e.g., Make
America Great Again [36] as well as political personalities
like Bernie Sanders, Obama, Putin, and Hillary Clinton.
When comparing the different communities, we observe
the most prevalent categories are memes (6 to 14 entries in
each community) and people (2-5). Moreover, in /pol/, the
2nd most popular entry is Adolf Hilter, which confirms pre-
vious reports of the community’s sympathetic views toward
Nazi ideology [20]. Overall, there are several memes with
hateful or disturbing content (e.g., holocaust). This happens
to a lesser extent in The Donald and Gab: the most popular
people after Donald Trump are contemporary politicians.
Finally, image posting behavior in fringe Web commu-
nities is greatly influenced by real-world events. For in-
stance, in /pol/, we find the #TrumpAnime controversy
event [49], where a political individual (Rick Wilson) of-
fended the alt-right community, Donald Trump supporters,
and anime fans (an oddly intersecting set of interests of
/pol/ users). Similarly, on The Donald and Gab, we find the
#Cnnblackmail [27] event, referring to the (alleged) black-
mail of the Reddit user that created the infamous video of
Donald Trump wrestling the CNN.
4.1.2 Memes’ Branching Nature
Next, we study how memes evolve by looking at variants
across different clusters. Intuitively, clusters that look alike
and/or are part of the same meme are grouped together under
the same branch of an evolutionary tree. We use the custom
distance metric introduced in Sec. 2.3, aiming to infer the
phylogenetic relationship between variants of memes. Since
there are 12.6K annotated clusters, we only report on a sub-
set of variants. In particular, we focus on “frog” memes (e.g.,
Pepe the Frog [39]); as discussed later in Sec. 4.2, this is one











































Figure 6: Visualization of the obtained clusters from /pol/,
The Donald, and Gab.
The dendrogram in Fig. 5 shows the hierarchical rela-
tionship between groups of clusters of memes related to
frogs. Overall, there are 525 clusters of frogs, belonging
to 23 different memes. These clusters can be grouped into
four large categories, dominated by different memes that ex-
press different ideas or messages: e.g., Apu Apustaja depicts
a simple-minded non-native speaker using broken English,
while the Feels Bad Man/Sad Frog (ironically) expresses
dismay at a given situation. The dendrogram also shows a
variant of Smug Frog (smug-frog-b) related to a variant of
the Russian Anti Meme Law [45] (anti-meme) as well as
relationships between clusters from Pepe the Frog and Isis
meme [33], and between Smug Frog and Brexit-related clus-
ters [50], as shown in Appendix C in [71].
The distance metric quantifies the similarity of any two
variants of different memes; however, recall that two clusters
can be close to each other even when the medoids are per-
ceptually different (see Sec. 2.3), as in the case of Smug Frog
variants in the smug-frog-a and smug-frog-b clusters (top of
Fig. 5). Although, due to space constraints, this analysis is
limited to a single “family” of memes, our distance metric
can actually provide useful insights regarding the phyloge-
netic relationships of any clusters. In fact, more extensive
analysis of these relationships (through our pipeline) can fa-
cilitate the understanding of the diffusion of ideas and infor-
mation across the Web, and provide a rigorous technique for
large-scale analysis of Internet culture.
4.1.3 Meme Visualization
We also use the custom distance metric (see Eq. 1) to
visualize the clusters with annotations. We build a graph
G = (V ,E), where V are the medoids of annotated clus-
ters and E the connections between medoids with distance
under a threshold κ. Fig. 6 shows a snapshot of the graph
for κ = 0.45, chosen based on the frogs analysis discussed
above. In particular, we select this threshold as the major-
ity of the clusters from the same meme (note coloration in
Fig. 5) are hierarchically connected with a higher-level clus-
ter at a distance close to 0.45.
To ease readability, we filter out nodes and edges that have
a sum of in- and out-degree less than 10, which leaves 40%
of the nodes and 92% of the edges. Nodes are colored ac-
cording to their KYM annotation. NB: the graph is laid out
using the OpenOrd algorithm [55] and the distance between
the components in it does not exactly match the actual dis-
tance metric. We observe a large set of disconnected com-
ponents, with each component containing nodes of primarily
one color. This indicates that our distance metric is indeed
capturing the peculiarities of different memes.
Finally, note that an interactive version of the full graph is
publicly available from [1].
4.2 Web Community-based Analysis
We now present a macro-perspective analysis of the Web
communities through the lens of memes. We assess the pres-
ence of different memes in each community, how popular
they are, and how they evolve. To this end, we examine the
posts from all four communities (Twitter, Reddit, /pol/, and
Gab) that contain images matching memes from fringe Web
communities (/pol/, The Donald, and Gab).
4.2.1 Meme Popularity
We start by analyzing clusters grouped by KYM ‘meme’
entries, looking at the number of posts for each meme in
/pol/, Reddit, Gab, and Twitter. (We also include the analysis
for ‘people’ entries in the extended version [71].)
In Table 4, we report the top 20 memes for each Web com-
munity sorted by the number of posts. We observe that Pepe
the Frog [39] and its variants are among the most popular
memes for every platform. While this might be an artifact
of using fringe communities as a “seed” for the clustering,
recall that the goal of this work is in fact to gain an under-
standing of how fringe communities disseminate memes and
influence mainstream ones. Thus, we leave to future work a
broader analysis of the wider meme ecosystem.
Sad Frog [31] is the most popular meme on /pol/ (4.9%),
the 3rd on Reddit (1.3%), the 10th on Gab (0.8%), and the
12th on Twitter (0.5%). We also find variations like Smug
Frog [46], Apu Apustaja [24], Pepe the Frog [39], and An-
gry Pepe [23]. Considering that Pepe is often used in hateful
or racist contexts [6], this once again confirms that polarized
communities like /pol/ and Gab do use memes to incite hate-
ful conversation. This is also evident from the popularity of
the anti-semitic Happy Merchant meme [32], which depicts
a “greedy” and “manipulative” stereotypical caricature of a
Jew (3.8% on /pol/ and 1.1% on Gab).
By contrast, mainstream communities like Reddit and
Twitter primarily share harmless/neutral memes, which are
rarely used in hateful contexts. Specifically, on Reddit the
top memes are Manning Face [37] (2.2%) and That’s the
Joke [47] (1.3%), while on Twitter the top ones are Roll
Safe [44] (5.9%) and Evil Kermit [30] (5.4%).
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/pol/ Reddit Gab Twitter
Entry Posts (%) Entry Posts (%) Entry Posts (%) Entry Posts(%)
Feels Bad Man/Sad Frog 64,367 (4.9%) Manning Face 12,540 (2.2%) Jesusland 454 (1.6%) Roll Safe 55,010 (5.9%)
Smug Frog 63,290 (4.8%) That’s the Joke 7,626 (1.3%) Demotivational Posters 414 (1.5%) Evil Kermit 50,642 (5.4%)
Happy Merchant 49,608 (3.8%) Feels Bad Man/ Sad Frog 7,240 (1.3%) Smug Frog 392 (1.4%) Arthur’s Fist 37,591 (4.0%)
Apu Apustaja 29,756 (2.2%) Confession Bear 7,147 (1.3%) Based Stickman 391 (1.4%) Nut Button 13,598 (1,5%)
Pepe the Frog 25,197 (1.9%) This is Fine 5,032 (0.9%) Pepe the Frog 378 (1.3%) Spongebob Mock 11,136 (1,2%)
Make America Great Again 21,229 (1.6%) Smug Frog 4,642 (0.8%) Happy Merchant 297 (1.1%) Reaction Images 9,387 (1.0%)
Angry Pepe 20,485 (1.5%) Roll Safe 4,523 (0.8%) Murica 274 (1.0%) Conceited Reaction 9,106 (1.0%)
Bait this is Bait 16,686 (1.2%) Rage Guy 4,491 (0.8%) And Its Gone 235 (0.9%) Expanding Brain 8,701 (0.9%)
I Know that Feel Bro 14,490 (1.1%) Make America Great Again 4,440 (0.8%) Make America Great Again 207 (0.8%) Demotivational Posters 7,781 (0.8%)
Cult of Kek 14,428 (1.1%) Fake CCG Cards 4,438 (0.8%) Feels Bad Man/ Sad Frog 206 (0.8%) Cash Me Ousside/Howbow Dah 5,972 (0.6%)
Laughing Tom Cruise 14,312 (1.1%) Confused Nick Young 4,024 (0.7%) Trump’s First Order of Business 192 (0.7%) Salt Bae 5,375 (0.6%)
Awoo 13,767 (1.0%) Daily Struggle 4,015 (0.7%) Kekistan 186 (0.6%) Feels Bad Man/ Sad Frog 4,991 (0.5%)
Tony Kornheiser’s Why 13,577 (1.0%) Expanding Brain 3,757 (0.7%) Picardia 183 (0.6%) Math Lady/Confused Lady 4,722 (0.5%)
Picardia 13,540 (1.0%) Demotivational Posters 3,419 (0.6%) Things with Faces (Pareidolia) 156 (0.5%) Computer Reaction Faces 4,720 (0.5%)
Big Grin / Never Ever 12,893 (1.0%) Actual Advice Mallard 3,293 (0.6%) Serbia Strong/Remove Kebab 149 (0.5%) Clinton Trump Duet 3,901 (0.4%)
Reaction Images 12,608 (0.9%) Reaction Images 2,959 (0.5%) Riot Hipster 148 (0.5%) Kendrick Lamar Damn Album Cover 3,656 (0.4%)
Computer Reaction Faces 12,247 (0.9%) Handsome Face 2,675 (0.5%) Colorized History 144 (0.5%) What in tarnation 3,363 (0.3%)
Wojak / Feels Guy 11,682 (0.9%) Absolutely Disgusting 2,674 (0.5%) Most Interesting Man in World 140 (0.5%) Harambe the Gorilla 3,164 (0.3%)
Absolutely Disgusting 11,436 (0.8%) Pepe the Frog 2,672 (0.5%) Chuck Norris Facts 131 (0.4%) I Know that Feel Bro 3,137 (0.3%)
Spurdo Sparde 9,581 (0.7%) Pretending to be Retarded 2,462 (0.4%) Roll Safe 131 (0.4%) This is Fine 3,094 (0.3%)
Table 4: Top 20 KYM entries for memes that we find our datasets. We report the number of posts for each meme as well as




























































































Figure 7: Percentage of posts per day in our dataset for all,
racist, and politics-related memes.
Once again, we find that users (in all communities) post
memes to share politics-related information, possibly aim-
ing to enhance or penalize the public image of politicians
(see Appendix C of the paper’s extended version [71] for an
example of such memes). For instance, we find Make Amer-
ica Great Again [36], a meme dedicated to Donald Trump’s
US presidential campaign, among the top memes in /pol/
(1.6%), in Reddit (0.8%), and Gab (0.8%). Similarly, in
Twitter, we find the Clinton Trump Duet meme [26] (0.4%),
a meme inspired by the 2nd US presidential debate.
We further group memes into two high-level groups, racist
and politics-related. We use the tags that are available in our
KYM dataset, i.e., we assign a meme to the politics-related
group if it has the “politics” or “2016 us presidential elec-
tion” tags, and to the racism-related one if the tags include
“racism,” “racist,” or “antisemitism,” obtaining 117 racist
memes and 396 politics-related memes. In the rest of this
section, we use these groups to further study the memes, and
later in Sec. 5 to estimate influence.
4.2.2 Temporal Analysis
Next, we study the temporal aspects of posts that contain
memes from /pol/, Reddit, Twitter, and Gab. In Fig. 7, we
plot the percentage of posts per day that include memes. For
all memes (Fig. 7(a)), we observe that /pol/ and Reddit fol-
low a steady posting behavior, with a peak in activity around
the 2016 US elections. We also find that memes are increas-
ingly more used on Gab (see, e.g., 2016 vs 2017).
As shown in Fig. 7(b), both /pol/ and Gab include a sub-
stantially higher number of posts with racist memes, used
over time with a difference in behavior: while /pol/ users
share them in a very steady and constant way, Gab exhibits
a bursty behavior. A possible explanation is that the former
is inherently more racist, with the latter primarily reacting
to particular world events. Also, we note that racist memes
spiked on Gab close to the Charlottesville incident in Au-
gust 2017 [67]. As for political memes (Fig. 7(c)), we find a
lot of activity overall on Twitter, Reddit, and /pol/, but with
different spikes in time. On Reddit and /pol/, the peaks coin-
cide with the 2016 US elections. For Gab, there is again an
increase in posts with political memes after January 2017.
4.3 Take-Aways
In summary, the main take-aways of our analysis include:
1. Fringe Web communities use many variants of me-
mes related to politics and world events, possibly aim-
ing to share weaponized information about them. For
instance, Donald Trump is the KYM entry with the
largest number of clusters in /pol/ (2.2%), The Donald
(6.1%), and Gab (2.2%).
2. /pol/ and Gab share hateful and racist memes at a
higher rate than mainstream communities, as we find a
considerable number of anti-semitic and pro-Nazi clus-
ters (e.g., The Happy Merchant meme [32] appears in
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1.3% of all /pol/ annotated clusters and 2.2% of Gab’s,
while Adolf Hitler in 0.6% of /pol/’s). This trend is
steady over time for /pol/ but ramping up for Gab.
3. Seemingly “neutral” memes, like Pepe the Frog (or one
of its variants), are used in conjunction with other me-
mes to incite hate or influence public opinion on world
events, e.g., with images related to terrorist organiza-
tions like ISIS or world events such as Brexit.
4. Our custom distance metric successfully allows us to
study the interplay and the overlap of memes, as show-
cased by the visualizations of the clusters and the den-
drogram (see Figs. 5 and 6).
5. INFLUENCE ESTIMATION
So far we have studied the dissemination of memes by
looking at Web communities in isolation. However, in re-
ality, these influence each other: e.g., memes posted on one
community are often re-posted to another. Aiming to capture
the relationship between them, we use a statistical model
known as Hawkes Processes [53, 54], which describes how
events occur over time on a collection of processes. This
maps well to the posting of memes on different platforms:
each community can be seen as a process, and an event oc-
curs each time a meme image is posted on one of the com-
munities. Events on one process can increase the likelihood
of subsequent events, including other processes, e.g., a per-
son might see a meme on one community and re-post it, or
share it to a different one.
5.1 Hawkes Processes
To model the spread of memes on Web communities, we
use a similar approach as in our previous work [72], which
looked at the spread of mainstream and alternative news
URLs. Next, we provide a brief description, and present an
improved method for estimating influence.
We use five processes, one for each of our seed Web com-
munities (/pol/, Gab, and The Donald), as well as Twitter
and Reddit, fitting a separate model for each meme clus-
ter. Fitting the model to the data yields a number of values:
background rates for each process, weights from each pro-
cess to each other, and the shape of the impulses an event
on one process causes on the rates of the others. The back-
ground rate is the expected rate at which events will occur
on a process without influence from the communities mod-
eled or previous events; this captures memes posted for the
first time, or those seen on a community we do not model
and then reposted on a community we do. The weights
from community-to-community indicate the effect an event
on one has on the others; for example, a weight from Twitter
to Reddit of 1.2 means that each event on Twitter will cause
an expected 1.2 additional events on Reddit. The shape of
the impulse from Twitter to Reddit determines how the prob-
ability of these events occurring is distributed over time; typ-
ically the probability of another event occurring is highest




















Figure 8: Representation of a Hawkes model with three pro-
cesses. Events cause impulses that increase the rate of sub-
sequent events in the same or other processes. By looking at
the impulses present when events occur, the probability of a
process being the root cause of an event can be determined.
Fig. 8 illustrates a Hawkes model with three processes.
The first event occurs on process B, which causes an increase
in the rate of events on all three processes. The second event
then occurs on process C, again increasing the rate of events
on the processes. The third event occurs soon after, on pro-
cess A. The fourth event occurs later, again caused by the
background arrival rate on process B, after the increases in
arrival rate from the other events have disappeared.
To understand the influence different communities have
on the spread of memes, we want to be able to attribute the
cause of a meme being posted back to a specific community.
For example, if a meme is posted on /pol/ and then someone
sees it there and posts it on Twitter where it is shared several
times, we would like to be able to say that /pol/ was the root
cause of those events. Obviously, we do not actually know
where someone saw something and decided to share it, but
we can, using the Hawkes models, determine the probability
of each community being the root cause of an event.
Looking again at Fig. 8, we see that events 1 and 4 are
caused directly by the background rate of process B. In the
case of event 1, there are no previous events, and in the case
of event 4, the impulses from previous events have already
stopped. Events 2 and 3, however, occur when there are mul-
tiple possible causes: the background rate for the community
and the impulses from previous events. In these cases, we
assign the probability of being the root cause in proportion
to the magnitudes of the impulses (including the background
rate) present at the time of the event. For event 2, the impulse
from event 1 is smaller than the background rate of commu-
nity C, so the background rate has a higher probability of
being the cause of event 2 than event 1. Thus, most of the
cause for event 2 is attributed to community C, with a lesser
amount to B (through event 1). Event 3 is more compli-
cated: impulses from both previous events are present, thus
the probability of being the cause is split three ways, be-
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/pol/ Twitter Reddit T D Gab
1,574,045 865,885 581,803 81,924 44,918
Table 5: Events per community from the 12.6K clusters.




































































Figure 9: Percent of the destination community’s racist (R)
and non-racist (NR) meme postings caused by the source
community. Colors indicate the percent difference between
racist and non-racist.
tween the background rate and the two previous events. The
impulse from event 2 is the largest, with the background rate
and event 1 impulse smaller. Because event 2 is attributed
both to communities B and C, event 3 is partly attributed to
community B through both event 1 and event 2.
In the rest of our analysis, we use this new measure. This
is a substantial improvement over the influence estimation
in [72], which used the weights and number of events to es-
timate total influence. The new method allows us to gain an
understanding of where memes that appear on a community
originally come from, and where they are likely to spread.
5.2 Influence
We fit Hawkes models for the 12.6K annotated clusters; in
Table 5, we report the total number of meme images posted
to each community in these clusters. We note that /pol/
has the greatest number of memes posted, followed by Twit-
ter and Reddit. Recall, however, that because our approach
is seeded with memes observed on /pol/, The Donald, and
Gab, it is possible that there are memes on Twitter and Red-
dit that are not included in the clusters. In addition, the raw
number of images (not necessarily memes) that appear on
the different communities varies greatly (see Table 1). This
yields an additional interesting question: how efficient are
different communities at disseminating memes?
First, we report the source of events in terms of the percent
of events on the destination community. This describes the
results in terms of the data as we have collected it, e.g., it
tells us the percentage of memes posted on Twitter that were
caused by /pol/. The second way we report influence is by
normalizing the values by the total number of events in the
source community, which lets us see how much influence
each community has, relative to the number of memes they
post—in other words, their efficiency.
Additional results are available in extended version of the
paper [71]; here we focus on the differences in the ways
communities disseminate different types of meme, in partic-
ular, racist (non-racist) and political (non-political) memes.




































































Figure 10: Percent of the destination community’s politi-
cal (P) and non-political (NP) meme postings caused by the
source community. Colors indicate the percent difference
between political and non-political.
























































































Figure 11: Influence from source to destination community
of racist and non-racist meme postings, normalized by the
number of events in the source community.
Using the clusters identified as either racist or non-racist
(see the end of Sec. 4.2.1), we compare how the commu-
nities influence the spread of these two types of content.
Fig. 9 shows the percentage of both the destination commu-
nity’s racist and non-racist meme posts caused by the source
community. We perform two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov
tests to compare the distributions of influence from the racist
and non-racist clusters; cells with statistically significant dif-
ferences between influence of racist/non-racist memes (with
p<0.01) are reported with a * in the figure. /pol/ has the most
total influence for both racist and non-racist memes, with the
notable exception of Twitter, where Reddit has the most the
influence. Interestingly, while the percentage of racist meme
posts caused by /pol/ is greater than non-racist for Reddit,
Twitter, and Gab, this is not the case for The Donald. The
only other cases where influence is greater for racist memes
are Reddit to The Donald and Gab to Reddit.
When looking at political vs non political memes
(Fig. 10), we see a somewhat different story. Here, /pol/
influences The Donald more in terms of political memes.
Further, we see differences in the percent increase and de-
crease of influence between the two figures (as indicated by
the cell colors). For example, Twitter has a relatively larger
difference in its influence on /pol/ and Reddit for political
and non-political memes than for racist and non-racist me-
mes, but a smaller difference in its influence on Gab and
The Donald. This exposes how different communities have
varying levels of influence depending on the type of memes
they post.
While examining the raw influence provides insights into
11
























































































Figure 12: Influence from source to destination community
of political and non-political meme postings, normalized by
the number of events in the source community.
the meme ecosystem, it obscures notable differences in the
meme posting behavior of the different communities. To ex-
plore this, we look at the normalized influence in Fig. 11
(racist/non-racist memes) and Fig. 12 (political/non-political
memes). As mentioned previously, normalization reveals
how efficient the communities are in disseminating memes
to other communities by revealing the per meme influence
of meme posts. First, we note that the percent change in in-
fluence for the dissemination of racist/non-racist memes is
quite a bit larger than that for political/non-political memes
(again, indicated by the coloring of the cells). More inter-
estingly, both figures show that, contrary to the total influ-
ence, /pol/ is the least influential when taking into account
the number of memes posted. While this might seem surpris-
ing, it actually yields a subtle, yet crucial aspect of /pol/’s
role in the meme ecosystem: /pol/ (and 4chan in general)
acts as an evolutionary microcosm for memes. The constant
production of new content [20] results in a “survival of the
fittest” [15] scenario. A staggering number of memes are
posted on /pol/, but only the best actually make it out to other
communities. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first
result quantifying this analogy to evolutionary pressure.
Take-Aways. There are several take-aways from our mea-
surement of influence. We show that /pol/ is, generally
speaking, the most influential disseminator of memes in
terms of raw influence, In particular, it is more influential
in spreading racist memes than non-racist one, and this dif-
ference is deeper than in any other community. There is one
notable exception: /pol/ is more influential in terms of non-
racist memes on The Donald. Relatedly, /pol/ has generally
more influence in terms of spreading political memes than
other communities. When looking at the normalized influ-
ence, however, we surface a more interesting result: /pol/ is
the least efficient in terms of influence while The Donald is
the most efficient. This provides new insight into the meme
ecosystem: there are clearly evolutionary effects. Many
meme postings do not result in further dissemination, and
one of the key components to ensuring they are disseminated
is ensuring that new “offspring” are continuously produced.
/pol/’s “famed” meme magic, i.e., the propensity to produce
and heavily push memes, is thus the most likely explanation
for /pol/’s influence on the Web in general.
6. RELATED WORK
Detection and Propagation of Memes. Leskovec et al. [52]
perform large-scale tracking of text-based memes, focusing
on news outlets and blogs. Ferrara et al. [16] detect text
memes using an unsupervised framework based on cluster-
ing techniques. Ratkiewicz et al. [60] introduce Truthy, a
framework supporting the analysis of the diffusion of text-
based, politics-related memes on Twitter. Babaei et al. [7]
study Twitter users’ preferences, with respect to informa-
tion sources, including how they acquire memes. Dubey
et al. [13] extract a rich semantic embedding correspond-
ing to the template used for the creation of meme images.
By contrast, we focus on the detection and propagation of
image-based memes without limiting our scope to image
macros. We also detect and study the propagation of memes
across multiple Web communities, using publicly available
data from memes annotation sites (i.e., KYM).
Popularity of Memes. Weng et al. [65, 66] study the pop-
ularity of memes spreading as hashtags on Twitter. They
model virality using an agent-based approach, taking into ac-
count that users have a limited capacity in receiving/viewing
memes on Twitter. They study the features that make me-
mes popular, finding that those based on network community
structures are strong indicators of popularity. Tsur and Rap-
poport [64] predict popularity of text-based memes on Twit-
ter using linguistic characteristics as well as cognitive and
domain features. Ienco et al. [21] study memes propagating
via text, images, audio, and video on the Yahoo! Meme plat-
form (a platform discontinued in 2012), aiming to predict
virality and select memes to be shown to users after login.
We also study the popularity of memes, however, unlike
previous work, we rely on a multi-platform approach, en-
compassing data from /pol/, Reddit, Twitter, and Gab, and
show that the popularity of memes depends on the Web com-
munity and its ideology. For instance, /pol/ is well-known
for its anti-semitic ideology and in fact the “Happy Mer-
chant” meme [32] is the 3rd most popular meme on /pol/.
Evolution of Memes. Adamic et al. [5] study the evolution
of text-based memes on Facebook, showing that it can be
modeled by the Yule process. They also find that memes
significantly evolve and new variants appear as they propa-
gate, and that specific communities within the network dif-
fuse specific variants of a meme. Bauckhage [8] study the
temporal dynamics of 150 popular memes using data from
Google Insights as well as social bookmarking services such
as Digg, showing that different communities exhibit differ-
ent interests/behaviors for different memes, and that epi-
demiology models can be used to predict the evolution and
popularity of memes. By contrast, we study the temporal
aspect of memes using Hawkes processes. This statistical
framework allows us to assess the causality of the posting
of memes on various Web communities, thus modeling their
evolution and their influence across multiple communities.
Case Studies. Heath et al. [19] present a case study of how
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people perceive memes with a focus on urban legends, find-
ing that they are more willing to share memes that evoke
stronger disgust. Xie et al. [68] focus on YouTube memes,
performing a large-scale keyword-based search for videos
related to the Iranian election in 2009, extracting frequently
used images and video segments. They show that most of
the videos are not original, thus, meme-related techniques
can be exploited to deduplicate content and capture the con-
tent diffusion on the Web. Finally, Dewan et al. [12] study
the sentiment and content of images that are disseminated
during crisis events like the 2015 Paris terror attacks. They
analyze 57K images related to the attacks, finding instances
of misinformation and conspiracy theories.
We also present a case study focusing on image memes of
Pepe the Frog (see the discussion about Fig. 5). This show-
cases both the overlap and the diversity of certain memes, as
well as how memes can be influenced by real-world events,
with new variants being generated. For instance, after the
Brexit referendum, memes with Pepe the Frog started to be
used in the Brexit context.
Fringe Communities. Previous work has also shed light
on fringe Web communities like 4chan, Gab, and sub-
communities within Reddit. Bernstein et al. [9] study the
ephemerality and anonymity features of the 4chan commu-
nity using data from the Random board (/b/). Hine et al. [20]
focus on the /pol/ board, analyzing 8M posts and detecting
a high volume of hate speech as well as the phenomenon
of “raids,” i.e., coordinated attacks aimed at disrupting other
services. Zannettou et al. [70] analyze 22M posts from 336K
users on Gab, finding that hate speech occurs twice as much
as in Twitter, but twice less than /pol/. Snyder et al. [63]
measure doxing on 4chan and 8chan, while Chandrasekha-
ran et al. [10] introduce a computational approach to detect
abusive content also looking at 4chan and Reddit.
Finally, Hawkes processes have also been used to quan-
tify influence of fringe Web communities like /pol/ and
The Donald to mainstream ones like Twitter in the context
of misinformation [72]. We follow a similar approach here,
but use an improved method of determining the influence of
the different communities.
7. DISCUSSION & CONCLUSION
In this paper, we presented a large-scale analysis of the
meme ecosystem. We introduced a novel image processing
pipeline and ran it over 160M images collected from four
Web communities (4chan’s /pol/, Reddit, Twitter, and Gab).
We clustered images from fringe communities (/pol/, Gab,
and Reddit’s The Donald) based on perceptual hashing and
a custom distance metric, annotated the clusters using data
gathered from Know Your Meme, and analyzed them along
a variety of axes. We then associated images from all the
communities to the clusters to characterize them through the
lens of memes and the influence they have on each other.
Our analysis highlights that the meme ecosystem is sur-
prisingly complex, with intricate relationships between dif-
ferent memes and their variants. We found important differ-
ences between the memes posted on different communities
(e.g., Reddit and Twitter tend to post “fun” memes, while
Gab and /pol/ racist or political memes). We also showed
that memes are often posted in response to world events,
e.g., political memes peaked around the 2016 US Presiden-
tial election and racist memes spiked on Gab close to the
Charlottesville incident in August 2017. When measuring
the influence that each community has with respect to dis-
seminating memes to other Web communities, we found that
/pol/ has the largest overall influence for racist and political
memes, however, /pol/ was the least efficient, i.e., in terms
of influence w.r.t. the total number of memes posted, while
The Donald is very successful in pushing memes to both
fringe and mainstream Web communities.
Our work constitutes the first attempt to provide a multi-
platform measurement of the meme ecosystem, with a fo-
cus on fringe and potentially dangerous communities. Con-
sidering the increasing relevance of digital information on
world events, our study provides a building block for future
cultural anthropology work, as well as for building systems
to protect against the dissemination of harmful ideologies.
Moreover, our pipeline can already be used by social net-
work providers to assist the identification of hateful content;
for instance, Facebook is already taking steps to ban Pepe
the Frog used in the context of hate [51], and our methodol-
ogy can help them automatically identify hateful variants.
Additional Results. Due to space constraints, we focused
on the most salient results, while leaving several to the ex-
tended version [71]. Some relevant “highlights” include:
1) Reddit posts including political memes receive higher
scores compared to non-political ones, and those with racist
memes lower scores than non-racist ones; 2) In general, Red-
dit users are more interested in politics-related memes than
other types, while The Donald is the most active subreddit
overall in terms of all memes as well as racist and politi-
cal ones; 3) A surprising number of racist memes appear in
seemingly “neutral” communities, e.g., the AdviceAnimals
subreddit; 4) Donald Trump is, by far, the most prevalent
political figure in image posts across all four communities.
Moreover, the extended version has appendices that provide
additional details of our screenshot classifier, a performance
evaluation of our processing pipeline, as well as interesting
instances of memes and meme clusters.
Future work. In future work, we plan to include memes
in video format, thus extending to other communities (e.g.,
YouTube). We also plan to study the content of the posts that
contain memes, incorporating OCR techniques to capture as-
sociated text-based features that memes usually contain, and
improving on KYM annotations via crowdsourced labeling.
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